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Collections Division AR 70-14 1OCT2013

EURA-5010/93  
1 March 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Video Conference on the Former  
Yugoslavia, 26 February 1993

1. The Deputies checked details of the upcoming airdrops, and tasked various papers to support Ambassador Bartholomew's efforts to operationalize US policy.
  2. Admiral Jeremiah predicted the airdrops will begin this weekend. We plan to leaflet Cerska, Zepa, and Gorazde Saturday night, and to drop humanitarian assistance (90% food, 10% medicines) on one of the three towns 24 hours later. We will add Serb or Croat locales if reliably reported to be in need. Bosnians acceptable to all three sides will help inspect cargos at Rhein-Main, and a general at EUCOM will brief the press after each mission.
- **Participation.** The Deputies would welcome German and Russian aircraft, and will allow Turkey and Pakistan to contribute goods delivered to Rhein-Main. Germany is checking to see if one of their C-160s is capable of participating, and the DDCI noted that a legal review requested by Foreign Minister Kinkel is underway. Peter Tarnoff judged that Turkey will object if rebuffed while Germany participates, but others noted that Germany is in a different category because Bonn already participates in the Sarajevo airlift. Similarly, Russian participation would be consistent with P-5 "cover" for this operation; Tarnoff said that Kozyrev promised to get back to us in 2-3 days after he sees Yeltsin. Noting that Congress wants allied participation, Ambassador Wisner suggested mixed crew.
- **Serbian airspace.** Our charge will promise General Panic tomorrow that we will notify Belgrade in advance if we expect to violate Serbian airspace. That would be likely if we conduct drops at Srebrenica.

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3. **Ambassador Bartholomew briefed the Deputies on his initial strategy in New York next week.**

- He expects Vance and Owen to push hard for agreement within 1-2 weeks; failing that, they will try to impose their plan. This poses three dangers: (1) there will be heavy pressure on the Muslims to sign, but--barring an imposed solution--they will hold out for "the cavalry;" (2) Vance and Owen will expect us to deliver the Muslims; and (3)
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- Bartholomew outlined three strategic goals: (1) provide for a survivable Bosnian state (which the Task Force believes is impossible beyond a transitional period); (2) avoid openly victimizing the Muslims--they are the clear losers, but we should help them with the map, governmental arrangements, provisions for people returning to their homes, etc.; and (3) broaden the process to include additional confidence-building measures or interim steps conducive to a settlement, such as a comprehensive cease-fire in Sarajevo.

- At least for next week, Bartholomew will be our "stealth" special envoy--in a listening mode until the US begins taking operational decisions.

4. Mr. Berger led the discussion of **next steps**, working from notes of yesterday's interagency working group. It was decided that:

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- **By Tuesday, the Balkan Task Force will assess the Vance-Owen plan's enforcement provisions.** Jenonne Walker explained that we agreed to provide a summary of the measures--and the Bosnian and troop-contributing parties' views of them--because OSD and JCS were reluctant to jump straight into defining US druthers. Berger and Bartholomew were impatient, however, to define what measures we believe are needed, what outside forces would be required, and how those forces should be organized. Walt Slocumbe agreed to circulate some terms of reference on Monday. (Nonetheless, we will proceed with the analysis of the Vance-Owen provisions).
  
- **By late next week, we will collaborate with INR to provide a "map analysis" covering what each of the Bosnian parties seeks and opposes, and suggesting negotiating strategies for Bartholomew.** (Bartholomew asks to know what is feasible, perhaps not yet realizing the extent to which Muslim and Serb territorial goals are irreconcilable. Meanwhile, Berger insists that the US not stake out any positions of our own.
  
- **State agreed to assess by mid-week the interim arrangements that Vance and Owen propose for a Bosnian government until elections can be held, and also to consider what confidence-building measures might be possible.**
  
- **OSD agreed to look at a cease-fire for Sarajevo, using the partially-implemented London Accords as a starting point.**
  
- **The NSC/IWG will task work to be done on Sarajevo, a cease-fire-in-place elsewhere, and emptying the detention camps.**

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- **Walt Slocumbe agreed to examine the notion of moving the talks to Sarajevo, as Berger said a Congressman suggested to President Clinton on Friday.**
- **Leon Fuerth explained that a team is leaving Sunday for Europe to push for tighter enforcement of sanctions on goods, while another team leaves Monday to urge stricter financial sanctions. (Task Force analysts are coming in Saturday to brief one or both of the teams.)**

**5. Berger and Walker explained the Gore-Izetbegovic meeting Saturday: to press Izetbegovic to stay at the talks in New York, to convince the Bosnian Government that the cavalry is not coming, and to explain that the US intends to work with the Bosnian Government to get a better deal, albeit not the Muslim's own deal.**

  
**Daniel W. Wagner**  
**Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force**

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